Critique of the Model of Logical Levels

Well, what is ultimately "logical" about these levels? Perhaps you asked yourself this last week as well. Here are a few thought-provoking insights that critically examine the logical levels.

Gregory Bateson pointed out that in the processes of learning, change, and communication, there are natural Hierarchies of Classification functions. The function of each level is to organize the information at the underlying level. The rules by which something is changed at a certain level differ from those by which something would be changed at an underlying level.

A change at one of the lower levels may, but does not necessarily have to, influence the levels above it; however, changing something at the upper levels necessarily changes things at the underlying levels to support the change at the higher levels. Bateson noted that problems often arise from confusing the logical levels.

I admit that this sentence lacks simple, logical consistency. Unfortunately, it is equally incomprehensible in the original English version. Dilts explains what he means by this as follows:

"I change my environment or influence it through my behavior. To change my behavior, I must be at the level above – that of abilities. I cannot really understand or change my behavior until I am above it.

The level of abilities could be compared to the puppeteer who controls a marionette.

To change an ability, I must be at the next higher level – at the level of beliefs.

And to change a belief, to step out of the influence of my beliefs so that I can really look at them and change them, I must start operating from my pure identity." (Dilts, pp. 67–68)

With our behavior, we influence the environment – that is certainly undisputed.

But: Do we have to be at the abilities level to understand or change our behavior? And is this level really to be understood like a "puppeteer"?

"Abilities" are, as is easy to see, a nominalization. When we denormalize this, we end up with "being able to", for example, to ski. Being able to ski is an ability, and skiing is an action or behavior. So if one wants to improve their behavior (e.g., the wedging), do they have to be at the abilities level?

What does this sentence mean? Is it not rather the case that the ski instructor gives me a hint, which I then implement in the form of exercises (at the behavior level)? If this goes well, my ability to wedge has improved – but I did not have to be at the "abilities level" for that.

From this nominalization, Dilts then creates an independent entity – a "puppeteer", as if neuromuscular patterns control skiing. Is it not rather the case that one uses these?

To what extent can one say that a toddler, when learning to walk, is at the level of abilities? Or that a client, when changing a behavior through anchoring fusion was at this level?

Such formulations are the result of nominalizing internal processes – for example, into an "abilities level".

And why must one be at the "abilities level" if one wants to understand their behavior? If I want to understand why I behave particularly insecurely towards beautiful women, and I bring unpleasant experiences from puberty back into consciousness with the help of a search anchor to change this – does that mean I was at the abilities level?

And to change abilities, must one be at the beliefs or values level? It is usually sufficient to practice something new and thereby acquire new abilities. Of course, there are cases where learning a new ability requires changing a limiting belief ("I'll never learn this anyway"). But that is not always necessary.

Even if the conditions are created at the level of values and beliefs that one considers it meaningful, desirable, and possible to acquire a certain ability – one does not acquire it by staying at this level, but by doing something new at the behavior level.